The Clean Water Act and the Constitution, 2nd Edition: Legal Structure and the Public's Right to a Clean and Healthy Environment by Robin Kundis Craig

Contents

  1. Acknowledgments xiii
  2. Introduction: Environmental Regulation and the Constitution 1
  3. Part I: Imposing Federal Regulation and Enforcement 7
  4. Chapter 1. The Clean Water Act’s “Cooperative Federalism”
    and the Federal/State Regulatory Balance     9
    1. I. A Short History of Pre-1972 Federal Water Quality Regulation in the United States 10
      1. A. The RHA (Refuse Act) 10
      2. B. The FWPCA of 1948 12
      3. C. The Water Pollution Control Act Extension of 1952 13
      4. D. Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1956 13
      5. E. The FWPCA Amendments of 1961 15
      6. F. Water Quality Act of 1965 17
      7. G. Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966 19
      8. H. Water and Environmental Quality Improvement Act of 1970 20
      9. I. The 1970 Changes to the RHA: A Federal Permit Program for Water Pollution 21
    2. II. The 1972 Amendments and the Creation of the Contemporary CWA 22
    3. III. Cooperative Federalism in the Current CWA 27
      1. A. Subchapter I: Research and Related Programs 27
      2. B. Subchapter II: Grants for Construction of Treatment Works 28
      3. C. Subchapter III: Standards and Enforcement 29
        1. 1. The Elements of Federal Jurisdiction Under the Contemporary CWA 29
        2. 2. Federal Standard Setting 31
        3. 3. Retained State Authority Over Water Quality 32
      4. D. Subchapter IV: Permits and Licenses 34
        1. 1. State Primacy Over Water Quality, Continued: Water Quality Certifications 34
        2. 2. The CWA’s Two Permit Programs 34
      5. E. Enforcement Under the CWA 35
  5. Chapter 2. The Supremacy Clause and Federal Preemption of State Water Quality Law 39
    1. I. The Supremacy Clause and Federal Preemption of State Law 40
    2. II. The CWA and Preemption of State Law 43
      1. A. The CWA’s “Saving” Clauses 43
      2. B. Express Preemption in the CWA: Marine Sanitation Devices and Traditional
        Federal Authority Over Navigation and Vessel Requirements         46
        1. 1. Section 312’s Express Preemption Provisions 46
        2. 2. Federal Preemption of Vessel Design in General 46
        3. 3. The Scope of §312’s Preemption 48
        4. 4. The CWA and the PWSA: An Uneasy Tension Between Vessel
          Design and Pollution Control           49
      3. C. Supremacy Clause Ambiguity: Preemption of State and Private Remedies for Oil Spills 51
      4. D. Implicit and Conflict Preemption in the CWA: Federal Preemption of Less Stringent
        State Regulation         53
      5. E. Conflict Preemption, Federalism, and the Ambiguous Status of State Water Quality
        Standards in Interstate River Systems         55
    3. III. The Overall Effect of the Supremacy Clause on the CWA 57
  6. Chapter 3. Interstate Water Pollution, Federal Common Law, and the Clean Water Act 59
    1. I. Interstate Water Pollution in the Court Before 1972 60
      1. A. Missouri v. Illinois 60
      2. B. Interstate Pollution Disputes, 1906-1972 63
    2. II. The CWA’s Interstate Water Pollution Provisions 67
      1. A. Section 401 67
      2. B. State-Issued CWA Permits and Interstate Water Quality 69
      3. C. Interstate Citizen Suits 70
    3. III. The CWA and the Federal Common Law of Nuisance 70
    4. IV. Interstate Water Pollution, the CWA, and State Common-Law Nuisance:
      International Paper Co. v. Ouellette       74
    5. V. Complex Rivers: A Resurgence of Federal Authority? 74
  7. Chapter 4. Sovereign Immunity and State Regulation of Federal Facilities and Tribes 77
    1. I. The CWA, Federal Facilities, and Federal Sovereign Immunity 77
      1. A. Introduction 77
      2. B. Federal Sovereign Immunity and State NPDES Permitting 81
      3. C. The Scope of the Waiver of Sovereign Immunity From State
        Permitting Requirements         84
      4. D. Federal Facility Liability for Civil Penalties Under State Programs 85
      5. E. Civil Penalties, Government Enforcement, and Federal Facility
        Compliance With the CWA         89
      6. F. Federal Facilities and State Water Quality Standards Outside
        the Point Source and Permitting Contexts         92
    2. II. Tribal Sovereign Immunity and State Regulation of Tribes 100
      1. A. Tribal Sovereign Immunity, Congress, and the CWA 100
      2. B. Tribal Sovereign Immunity, the States, and the CWA 100
      3. C. Congress’ Emphasis on Tribal Sovereign Immunity:
        Treatment-as-a-State (TAS) Status         105
  8. Chapter 5. Limits on Federal Water Quality Regulation: The Tenth Amendment,
    the Commerce Clause, and Clean Water Act “Navigable Waters”     109
    1. I. The Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment 110
    2. II. The CWA’s “Navigable Waters” 116
    3. III. CWA “Navigable Waters” and the Commerce Clause 119
      1. A. Early Commerce Clause Evaluations of the CWA 119
      2. B. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. and Adjacent Wetlands 121
      3. C. Isolated Waters and the Commerce Clause Debate 122
      4. D. The Court’s Statutory Interpretation, Part II 125
      5. E. Federalism as a Mode of CWA Interpretation, 2001-2006 128
      6. F. Rapanos v. United States: Federalism, Wetlands, and
        Congress’ Water Quality Goals         131
      7. G. CWA Jurisdiction in the Lower Courts After Rapanos: Deciding Among the Justices 138
    4. IV. “Navigable Waters” and the Commerce Clause: What Is the Constitutional Limit
      of Congress’ Authority to Regulate Water Quality?       141
      1. A. The Channels of Interstate Commerce: The Oceans, Contiguous Zones,
        Territorial Seas, and Traditionally Navigable Waters         141
      2. B. Non-Navigable Interstate Waters 144
      3. C. Non-Navigable Intrastate Waters and the Substantial
        Relationship to Interstate Commerce         144
  9. Chapter 6. Limiting Federal and State Enforcement of the Clean Water Act:
    Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment “Takings” of Private Property     149
    1. I. The History of the Regulatory Takings Doctrine 149
    2. II. Distinguishing Physical and Regulatory Takings 157
    3. III. Regulatory “Takings” and the CWA 159
      1. A. Is the “Taking” Claim Ripe? 160
      2. B. Is There a Lucas-Type Categorical “Taking”? 161
      3. C. Is There a “Taking” Under the Penn Central Balancing Test? 162
        1. 1. The Character of the Government Action 163
        2. 2. Interference With the Claimant’s Reasonable, Investment-Backed
          Expectations for the Property           163
        3. 3. Economic Impact of the Permit Denial 164
      4. D. Can There Be a Temporary “Taking”? 165
    4. IV. The Overall Effect of Fifth Amendment “Takings” on the CWA’s Regulatory Regime 166
  10. Part II: Imposition of Citizen Participation and Enforcements 169
  11. Chapter 7. The Second Theme in Congress’ Restructuring of the Federal Water Pollution
    Control Act: The Addition of Citizen Participation and Citizen Suits     171
    1. I. Citizen Participation in the Clean Water Act (CWA) and the Creation of the CWA’s
      Citizen Suit Provision       171
    2. II. Later Amendments to the CWA’s Citizen Suit Provision 176
    3. III. Bringing a CWA Citizen Suit: The Statutory Requirements 177
      1. A. Causes of Action 177
      2. B. Jurisdiction and Venue 181
      3. C. The Notice Requirement 181
      4. D. The Gwaltney Requirement 184
      5. E. Preclusion by State and Federal Enforcement 186
    4. IV. Citizen Suit Enforcement and the CWA 190
  12. Chapter 8. Article III Separation of Powers, Standing, and the Rejection of a
    “Public Rights” Model of Environmental Citizen Suits     193
    1. I. Article III and Federal Courts’ “Case or Controversy” Requirement 193
    2. II. Environmental Standing and Citizen Suits 199
      1. A. Early Environmental Standing Cases 199
      2. B. Sierra Club v. Morton and the Elimination of Privately Enforceable
        Public Environmental Rights         199
      3. C. Further Refinement of Environmental Standing Requirement in the 1990s 204
      4. D. Relaxing Injury-in-Fact Since 2000? Resonable Fears, Climate Change, and
        Increased Risk in the Standing Analysis         208
        1. 1. The 2000 Decision in Laidlaw 208
        2. 2. The Court’s 2007 Standing Analysis in Massachusetts v. EPA:
          Liberalization of Defenders of Wildlife or Special Standing for States?           209
        3. 3. The Increased Risk Standing Trend 213
    3. III. Standing and CWA Litigation 214
  13. Chapter 9. Citizen Suits Against the Federal Government and Tribes 219
    1. I. The CWA’s Waiver of Sovereign Immunity for Subsection (a)(1) Citizen Suits Against
      Federal Facilities That Are Violating the Act       219
      1. A. Section 505’s Procedurally Limited Waiver of Sovereign Immunity 219
      2. B. Attempts to Evade §505’s Limitations 221
      3. C. Civil Penalties in Citizen Suits Against the Federal Government 222
    2. II. Section 505’s Waiver of Sovereign Immunity for Subsection (a)(1) Citizen Suits
      Against Tribes That Are Violating the CWA       226
    3. III. The CWA’s Waiver of Sovereign Immunity for Subsection (a)(2) Citizen Suits
      Against the EPA Administrator for Failure to Perform Nondiscretionary Duties       228
      1. A. Suits Against the Administrator of EPA 228
      2. B. Suits Against the Corps 229
  14. Chapter 10. Citizen Suits Against States and Territories and the Eleventh Amendment 233
    1. I. Congress’ Attempt to Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity in the CWA and
      the U.S. Supreme Court’s Eleventh Amendment Jurisprudence       233
    2. II. CWA Citizen Suits Against States After Seminole Tribe 239
      1. A. Citizen Suits Against States and State Agencies 239
      2. B. CWA Citizen Suits Against State Officials: The Ex Parte Young Doctrine 241
      3. C. Cooperative Federalism as a Waiver of Eleventh Amendment
        Sovereign Immunity?         245
    3. III. CWA Citizen Suits Against Territories and the District of Columbia
      After Seminole Tribe       247
      1. A. Citizen Suits Against Territories 247
        1. 1. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico 248
        2. 2. Virgin Islands 249
        3. 3. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands 250
        4. 4. The CNMI 251
        5. 5. Guam 252
        6. 6. American Samoa 254
      2. B. CWA Citizen Suits Against the District of Columbia 254
    4. IV. The Effects of Seminole Tribe on Citizen Suits Against States 255
  15. Chapter 11. Article II Separation of Powers and the President’s Enforcement Right 257
    1. I. Article II Separation-of-Powers Principles 257
      1. A. Article II Separation of Powers and the “Take Care” Clause 258
      2. B. Separation of Powers and the Appointments Clause 261
    2. II. Article II Separation-of-Powers Issues and Environmental Citizen
      Suits: Decisions to Date       264
      1. A. The “Take Care” Clause and Environmental Citizen Suits 266
      2. B. The Appointments Clause and Environmental Citizen Suits 269
      3. C. Do Citizen Suits Allow the Federal Courts and Congress to Usurp the Executive? 270
    3. III. Resolving Article II Separation-of-Powers Challenges to Environmental
      Citizen Suit Provisions       271
      1. A. The Qui Tam Comparison 272
      2. B. Environmental Citizen Suits and Standing 276
      3. C. Would Public Interest Citizen Suits Violate Article II Separation of Powers? 277
  16. Conclusion: Should There Be a Constitutional Right to a Clean/Healthy Environment? 281
    1. I. The Importance of Citizen Suits to Environmental Enforcement 284
    2. II. Constitutional Jurisprudence and Environmental Citizen Suit Litigation 291
    3. III. Restoring Citizen Enforcement of Federal Environmental Law: Two Possible Solutions 292
      1. A. Adopt a Public Rights/Public Interest Approach to Citizen Litigation 292
      2. B. Amend the Constitution 293
    4. IV. The Purely Structural Amendment 293
      1. A. Standing 295
      2. B. Eleventh Amendment 295
      3. C. Federal Sovereign Immunity 296
      4. D. Article II Separation-of-Powers Concerns 297
      5. E. Elimination of Commerce Clause Concerns 297
      6. F. Balancing of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment “Takings” 297
      7. G. A Proposed Structural Amendment to the Constitution 297
    5. V. The Amendment Adding a Substantive Constitutional Right to a Clean and
      Healthy Environment       298
      1. A. Prior Litigation Indicates That Spontaneous Recognition of Environmental
        Rights in the Constitution Are Unlikely         299
      2. B. Normative Arguments Favor a Constitutional Amendment Guaranteeing a Right to
        Sue, But Not Necessarily a Substantive Environmental Right         300
        1. 1. The Law Generally Recognizes That Beneficiaries Should
          Have the Right to Sue           300
        2. 2. Constitutional Environmental Protections Are Becoming More Prevalent
          Among the Nations of the World, Indicating That the
          Environment Is Worthy of Constitution-Level Concern           302
        3. 3. Individual States Within the United States—the Vanguard of American
          Law—Are Also Increasingly Recognizingy That the
          Environment Should Be a Constitutional Concern           304
    6. VI. Conclusion 306